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Honour, Duelling and Royal Power




 L’étude des duels  d’honneur et des violences entre courtisans à la cour 
de Charles II  d’Angleterre en exil aux Pays-Bas espagnols à la fin des années 
1650 éclaire les relations de pouvoir et  d’honneur entre les souverains et 
leurs élites à  l’époque moderne. En étudiant les suites de deux duels qui, 
directement ou indirectement,  concernaient un noble irlandais, Théobald, 
vicomte de Taaffe, cet article examine les motifs de ces violences et le point 
de savoir si  l’exil a modifié les pratiques de duel au sein de celle-ci. Il éclaire 
aussi la manière dont les nobles défendaient leur implication dans ces  conflits 
et les efforts de Charles II, pater familias de cette cour royale, pour les 
prévenir ou les  contrôler. En définitive, cette étude remet en cause la thèse 
de Norbert Elias visant la manière dont les familles royales civilisaient et 
 contrôlaient les pulsions violentes de  l’élite et de la noblesse qui leur était 
attachée. Elle  conclut en effet que Charles II partageait la même  conception 
de  l’honneur que ses courtisans, ce qui implique  qu’en dépit de ses efforts 
pour les  contrôler, il ne pouvait dénier à son entourage le droit de défendre 
sa réputation et sa position sociale  d’une manière socialement acceptable, 
telle que le duel. 
Through an examination of honour duels and violence between the 
courtiers within Charles  II’s exiled court in late 1650s Spanish Netherlands, 
this article casts light on the power and honour relationships between 
monarchs and their elites in the early-modern period. It does this by primarily 
studying the fallout from two duels that, directly or indirectly, involved an 
Irish nobleman, Theobald Viscount Taaffe. The article  considers the reasons 
that motivated elite violence in this court and also examines if exile changed 
duelling practices within it. It also throws light on how the courtiers defended 
their involvement in such clashes. The efforts of the pater familias of this 
royal household, Charles II, to prevent or limit such violent behaviour are 
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also studied. Ultimately the article challenges Norbert Elias’ thesis on how 
royals civilised and  controlled the violent impulses of their elite and noble 
followers. It does so by  concluding that Charles II shared the same  concept of 
honour as his courtiers. This meant that, despite Charles  II’s efforts to  control 
violence in his own royal household, he could not deny his followers the right 
to defend their own good name and social standing in a socially acceptable 
manner, such as the duel.
Duelling in early modern Britain and Ireland has been a subject of  considerable academic scrutiny over the last four decades. Donna  Andrew’s article on 
the opposition to duelling in England over the course of eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries at the beginning of the 1980s can be seen as an important step in this. The 
same decade ended with Victor  Kiernan’s survey of the history of the duel in Europe. 
This work nonetheless retained a particularly British focus. Written in 1995, James 
 Kelly’s book on duelling in Ireland threw even more light on the practice both there 
and in Britain, and has become the standard account of the phenomenon in that 
country, giving a  compelling overview of its history there from the sixteenth into the 
nineteenth century.2 Since then other works have been produced which add to our 
understanding of duelling in Britain and Ireland during that era. Robert Shoemaker, 
for his part, has examined how duelling evolved on these islands between the 
Restoration and the 1800s to become more ritualised, less bloody and less  common. 
Markku  Peltonen’s book studying the link between civility, honour and duelling in 
early modern England has advanced our understanding of the social assumptions 
and values underpinning the practice, while Roger  Manning’s work on the martial 
 culture of  England’s seventeenth-century elite has also highlighted the importance 
of such clashes to this caste. These books, along with the work of Richard Cust 
and Andrew Hopper, have likewise thrown light on official and unofficial efforts 
to curtail the practice in early-Stuart England. More recently, Richard Banks has 
written a survey of pistol duelling in eighteenth and nineteenth century England.3
This article aims to further our understanding on both the nature and significance 
of duelling through a study of the practice in a specific  context, namely Charles  II’s 
exiled court between the years 1649-1660. I hope to do this by studying some of the 
best-documented duels there. I shall especially focus on a duel from August 1658, 
between a Catholic Irish nobleman and favourite of Charles II, Theobald Viscount 
Taaffe, and a Scottish Presbyterian gentleman, Sir William Keith. This  combat, which 
is documented in great detail, has featured in many historical studies of the Stuart 
period, as well as in some studies of violence.  Kelly’s study of duelling, for instance, 
cites this  contest to support his justifiable  contention that Irish royalist exiles had 
a major role in spreading the practice to Ireland.4 I will likewise examine another 
well-documented duel from early 1659, between Edward Stanley, a son of the Earl 
of Derby, and another Scottish exile, James Livingston, Viscount Newburgh. These 
duels, of course, may not be representative of other such  contests during the exile, 
but the amount of evidence available for them certainly suggests that they were seen 
as significant. Furthermore,  duelling’s status as both a private and illegal act, even in 
2 Andrew (1980) ; Kiernan (1988) ; Kelly (1995).
3 Shoemaker (2002) ; Manning (2003) ; Peltonen (2003) ; Cust, Hopper (2006) ; Banks (2010).
4 Birch (1742a, p. 576) ; Kelly (1995, p. 30).
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exile, often means that the information necessary to carry out a  comparison between 
duels, or even to quantify them, is unavailable.
Despite the difficulty in quantifying duelling in this court, it is fair to say that 
such  contests happened frequently. Accounts of violent deeds, duels and brawls 
regularly feature in the historiography on Charles  II’s exile. Ronald Hutton has 
argued that duelling was both a prominent and  consistent feature of life amongst 
the royalist exiles. It is equally reasonable to say that questions of honour were the 
leading cause of these incidents.5 This, unsurprisingly, was not especially unique 
to this court. As many general studies of all the Stuart royal courts have noted, 
questions of honour frequently led to duels and violence amongst their members. 
Violence between courtiers also occurred in other exiled courts. Nathalie Genet-
Rouffiac, in her work on the banished Jacobite household of the late 1600s and early 
1700s, has drawn attention to the high levels of violence and blames it on a sense 
of dispossession and powerlessness prevalent amongst the exiles. Surveys of other 
early-modern courts, meanwhile, have also highlighted the propensity to violence 
within all such institutions, attributing it to courts being places where warriors, 
 competitors and rival suitors gathered around a prince.6 Indeed, duelling was a 
phenomenon found amongst those  contemporary members of the British and Irish 
elites beyond the reach of the exiled court as well. It was a problem amongst elite 
royalists in Scotland during the 1650s. The prevalence of duelling in 1650s England 
also forced Cromwell to issue an ordinance against the practice in 1654.7 In a wider 
 context, then, the tendency of Charles  II’s exiled courtiers to resort to violence both 
to defend their honour and to resolve disputes was not exceptional.
Yet, while duelling was not unique to the exiled Caroline Stuart court, one 
cannot escape the impression, supported by  contemporary anecdotal evidence, that 
this form of violence was unusually prevalent within it. Contemporaries believed 
this to be especially true for the years 1656-59, when Charles  II’s court was in the 
Spanish Netherlands. A letter of 10 March 1658 to the  King’s secretary, Sir Edward 
Nicholas, mentions a duel between Viscount Newburgh and a Captain Breame. The 
same letter also states that Edward Stanley had challenged Sir James Hamilton to a 
duel over a jest, and another courtier, George Benion, challenged a Mr. Silvius over a 
gambling debt, though violence was avoided in both of the last two cases. In another 
letter describing a duel, written in September 1658 to his brother in Scotland, Sir 
Richard Newport  commented upon the marked tendency for the royalist exiles to 
argue amongst themselves, stating that “tis [sic] strange [i.e. surprising] to hear of 
the dissensions amongst the exiled English, Scotch and Irish in Flanders”.8 The three 
questions that face us are these : first, assuming  contemporary claims are correct, 
how do we account for the seemingly widespread occurrence of the duel in this 
exiled court ; second, what were the unique characteristics of the duel in this setting, 
if any ; finally, what insights can a study of duelling in this environment provide ?
In addressing these questions, I work on the assumption that this was a genuine 
royal court. I do this because, even in exile, it  continued to be both a  monarch’s 
5 Hutton (1989, pp. 122-123) ; British Library, Egerton, Mss, vol. 2535/130-1.
6 Hibbard (1996, p. 160) ; Genet-Rouffiac (1995, p. 38) ; Muchembled (2002, p. 159).
7 MacDonald (2008, p. 348) ; Cromwell (1654, pp. 1-5) ; Green (1879, pp. 217, 218, 404) ; ibid. (1886, 
pp. 135 & 175).
8 Green (1884, pp. 310-311) ; HMC (1876, pp. 146-147).
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household and the centre of royal political activity. Additionally, many on the 
 continent still saw Charles II as a legitimate royal during this decade. Venetian 
ambassadors, for instance, still referred to him as a king, or prince. Many in Britain 
and Ireland also accepted him as their rightful monarch at this time. Irish Language 
poetry, a medium frequently used for expressing political views in the early modern 
era, often expressed support for the exiled monarch. There were even spies who, 
despite working for the Commonwealth, referred to Charles II as the “King of 
Scots”.9 Finally, it is obvious that those who followed him into exile did so because 
they accepted his claim to royal status and power. I also work on the assumption 
that Charles  II’s lack of a territorial kingdom in these years is no barrier to regarding 
his court as a royal one. Though he failed to  control either Britain or Ireland during 
the 1650s, and lived outside them for most of this period, this monarch nevertheless 
claimed sovereignty over the peoples there. For royalists, exile did not represent a 
problem in this regard, as they argued that sovereignty was vested in the  monarch’s 
person, regardless of where he was. There can also be little doubt that Charles II 
 commanded a sizeable number of followers during his exile. Aside from his own 
courtiers, he also was able to put together a military force of between 3,000-5,000 
men during his time in the Spanish Netherlands, for example. This King, it would 
seem, was also permitted to exercise jurisdiction over them. He was certainly 
allowed to do this in the area of religious affairs in the latter territory, so long as he 
did so discreetly. Previously, in 1655, while in the electorate of Cologne, the exiled 
court executed a courtier for treason, with the collusion of local authorities.10
FROM LOCAL LORD TO  KING’S COMPANION,
THEOBALD VISCOUNT TAAFFE
An MP in the Irish Parliament during the 1630s, Taaffe was a mid-rank, 
provincial Irish nobleman of modest importance. His rise to prominence began in 
the late 1630s and 1640s, just as inter- connected civil wars, the Bishops’ wars, the 
Irish  confederate wars and three English civil wars, broke out in Britain and Ireland. 
The Bishops’ wars started in 1638 because of a religious dispute between Charles 
I and his Scottish Presbyterian subjects, and ended in an embarrassing defeat for 
the King in 1641, as he lost Scotland to his rivals. Later in 1641 an Irish Catholic 
rebellion in Ulster, provoked by, among other things, the rising power of Protestant 
colonial elites in Ireland, soon turned into a nationwide event. By 1642 Irish Catholic 
rebels had organised themselves into a body known as the ‘Confederate Catholics of 
Ireland’, and were soon engaged in political negotiations with Charles I, as well as 
military  conflict with Scottish Presbyterian colonists in Ulster and English Protestant 
colonists in the south of Ireland. Meanwhile, the first English civil war between 
Charles  I’s royalist supporters and the English Parliament began in 1642.
These different  conflicts soon intertwined with each other. Once the Irish wars 
started, Protestant settlers in Ulster received military support from  Scotland’s 
Presbyterians (or ‘Covenanters’). As mentioned earlier, Charles I entered into 
 9 Hinds (1931, p. 43) ; Birch (1742a, p. 294) ;  O’Rahilly (1952, pp. 99-100) ; Mitchison (1990, pp. 62-
64) ; Ashton, (1985, p. 409) ; Daly (1971, p. 43).
10 Cronin (2007, pp. 183, 203, 222) ; Scott (1907, pp. 146-152).
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alliance negotiations with Irish  confederate Catholics in 1642. This caused many 
Protestants in Ireland to turn to the English Parliament for further assistance. The 
following year the Covenanters allied with the English Parliament, entering into 
the first English civil war. This particular  conflict ended in 1647, with Charles  I’s 
defeat. The following year, however, a second English civil war erupted, when the 
Covenanters switched allegiances and, in return for religious  concessions, allied 
with Charles I. This English  conflict ended in defeat for the King once again, 
however. Furthermore, the English Parliament put the defeated Monarch on trial 
for his life and executed him in early 1649. The regicide almost neatly coincided 
with a significant development in Ireland. Conflict and political negotiations had 
 continued there throughout the 1640s. In early 1649, royalists and Irish Confederate 
Catholics finally agreed an alliance. This meant that royalists, led by Charles  I’s heir, 
Charles II, still potentially posed a threat to the English Parliament. Consequently, 
in August 1649, an English Parliamentary army landed in Ireland and over the next 
two years quashed all Catholic-royalist forces in the country. In 1650, while the 
English Parliament was subduing Ireland, Charles II renewed his  father’s alliance 
with Scottish Presbyterians against the English Parliament, landed in Scotland and 
gathered a new army there. This led to the third English civil war, which proved to 
be the last significant challenge to English Parliamentary dominance in Britain and 
Ireland. The  Parliament’s army disposed of this threat in September 1651, when it 
defeated Charles  II’s army at Worcester. This sent him into exile for nearly a decade.11
Taaffe initially became involved in the royalist cause when he fought for Charles 
I in the first English Civil War in 1642, returning to Ireland in 1643 to attend the 
Catholic Confederate Assembly at Kilkenny and to fight in the wars there. He became 
 commander of the Connacht Confederate army the next year.  Taaffe’s loyalty to 
the Catholic Confederates was soon doubted, however, as he refused to take the 
Confederate oath of Association and was replaced as  commander in Connacht. 
Taaffe later supported the Duke of Ormond, Charles  I’s Irish Lord Lieutenant, during 
efforts to negotiate an alliance between the Confederates and the Royalists in the 
mid-1640s, but he was disappointed by the failure of a treaty between both sides, 
known as the First Ormond Peace, to be accepted in 1646. Taaffe was marginalised 
within the Catholic Confederates for some time after, but he returned to centre stage 
in 1647 when he became  commander of the Munster Confederate army. Taaffe, 
however, was not a  competent general and Munster Protestant forces destroyed his 
army at the battle of Knocknanuss in November that year.12
Taaffe became more notable after he went into exile in  continental Europe in 
1649, however, soon after the Confederate-royalist alliance that year. Like many 
others, he initially used exile to put himself out of the reach of his enemies and to 
advance opposition to the English Parliament. He soon became central to royalist 
negotiations for military assistance from the Duke of Lorraine, but ultimately 
could not  conclude them successfully. His subsequent attempt to lead a royalist 
embassy to Rome was also a failure, being scuppered before it even started. All this 
coincided with the  Parliament’s victory in Ireland and Charles  II’s ill-fated Scottish 
alliance ; events which left Taaffe, and many others, stranded in long-term exile on 
11 For an accessible account of these wars, see, Kenyon, Ohlmeyer (1998).
12 Ó Siochrú (2009). For more on the Confederation of Kilkenny and events in Ireland in the 1640s, see 
Ó Siochrú (2008).
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the  continent. During the 1650s Taaffe rose to prominence within royalist ranks 
as a social  companion to Charles II. He became central to the  King’s dalliances 
with various women, acting as an intermediary between Charles II and his female 
 companions. In 1651, while the King was in Scotland, Taaffe became the protector 
of Lucy Walter, Charles’ mistress. He subsequently fathered a  child with her. Despite 
this, Taaffe grew in the  King’s  confidence during these years. Cardinal De Retz, in 
his memoirs, described Taaffe as being the  King’s chamberlain, valet, squire and 
butler during the exile, and one modern  commentator has described him, justifiably, 
as Charles  II’s “unofficial master of the revels” in the same period. Indeed, one could 
argue that Taaffe actually benefitted from banishment in some way, as it allowed him 
to become a close  companion to Charles II. He even became one of the  King’s privy 
councillors, though he never became a major political figure amongst the  King’s 
inner circle. Taaffe was also active militarily during the exile. Prior to 1656 he played 
a notable role in  controlling Irish mercenary soldiers on the Stuarts’ behalf. In 1655, 
for instance, he prevented Irish soldiers in Flanders from defecting to the French. 
After the royalists formed a military alliance with the Spanish in 1656, he became 
a regimental  commander in the Stuarts’ small army in Flanders, formed from Irish 
and British troops based on the Continent.13 Yet, despite his obvious pre-eminence at 
this time, when he killed Sir William Keith in a duel over a gambling debt in August 
1658 Taaffe found himself banished from the  King’s presence and the royal court for 
some time, despite his pleas for forgiveness.14
KILLING KEITH : ITS  CONSEQUENCES AND SIGNIFICANCE
The duel arose from an argument over a sum of seven sovereigns, which Taaffe 
claimed he and Richard Talbot had won at tennis from Edward Stanley and Sir 
Richard Hopton, both English gentlemen. Taaffe was owed four sovereigns, while 
Talbot was owed three. Keith did not play in the tennis match, but he already owed a 
sum of money to Hopton, and the latter gentleman decided to use this to pay Taaffe 
and Talbot. Hopton  consequently asked Taaffe if he would accept payment from 
Keith in settlement of the debt and the Viscount agreed. Taaffe later claimed that 
when Keith paid the debt, he kept three sovereigns for Talbot, but offered to return 
the other four to the Scottish gentleman. Keith refused this, however, at which point 
Taaffe departed. Taaffe went on to state that soon after Hopton caught up with him 
and demanded that the Irish nobleman return the four sovereigns to Keith or give 
some other satisfaction. Taaffe claimed to be angered by this and responded that he 
would provide satisfaction with his sword.15
The duel that arose from all this followed French fashions. In this format the 
fighting was not  confined to the principals, but involved the seconds (and sometimes 
others) as well. Talbot agreed to act as  Taaffe’s second, while Hopton  consented to 
do the same for Keith. All the duellists initially decided to meet on the field of honour 
at two  o’clock that afternoon. Before the duel itself, they all went to lunch, where 
13 Cronin (2007, pp. 47-51, 170, 220-221) ; Ó Siochrú (2009) ; Firth (1903, p. 71) ; Pernot (2003, 
p. 448) ; Crist (1974, p. vi).
14 Crist (1974, p.v.). Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/181.
15 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/183.
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they met Sir William Fleming, a Scottish royalist agent, George Benion, Captain 
Breames and a Mister Davis. This caused the duel to become even bigger. Benion 
approached Taaffe after they had eaten. The former informed the Irish nobleman 
that he had heard of the proposed duel from Edward Stanley and that Fleming also 
knew of it. Benion added that he would endeavour to stop it. To prevent this, Taaffe 
engaged Benion to fight on his side in the duel, and sent him back to Fleming to ask 
him (Fleming) to fight with Keith. Fleming readily  consented. Keith likewise asked 
Davis and Breames to participate in the duel. They too agreed, Davis taking  Taaffe’s 
part and Breames taking  Keith’s. The participants then re-scheduled the duel for six 
 o’clock.16
All this ultimately climaxed in a triple fight between Talbot, Benion, and Taaffe, 
on one side, and Hopton, Fleming, and Keith on the other. Breames did not turn up 
at the appointed time, and Davis was persuaded to drop out to keep the numbers of 
 combatants even. Many of these men were inveterate duellists. We have already 
noted the challenge issued by Benion in 1657. Taaffe had likewise tried to fight a duel 
in 1657 with another exile, the Earl of Bristol.17 Indeed,  Taaffe’s duelling tendencies 
predated the exile. On the eve of the battle of Knocknanuss, Taaffe offered his opposite 
number, Lord Inchiquin, the opportunity to fight what was essentially a large-scale 
duel, proposing a  contest between 2,000 foot a side “more for recreation” than for 
any serious military reason. This offer had its parallels in other near- contemporary 
theatres of war, and, like those, had more to do with an individual sense of honour 
and glory than with sound military reasoning. Unsurprisingly, Inchiquin declined 
this challenge.18 Talbot was also no stranger to duelling. He had fought a duel in 
1656 with Charles McCarthy, Viscount Muskerry, over the  latter’s attempt to deny 
him a  commission as Lieutenant Colonel in the Duke of  York’s regiment.19
The duel itself was a sanguinary affair. While Taaffe killed Keith, Benion 
wounded Fleming. Hopton and Talbot also fought, but did not inflict any injury on 
each other. Soon after, Taaffe fled the court, though he later denied that he did this to 
avoid royal justice.20 This particular clash soon became notorious in  contemporary 
reports of events and was the subject of much talk amongst both the royalist exiles, 
and others. These reports did not credit the participants with any fame or honour, 
though. Many found the trivial cause of this fatal dispute, and its rapid escalation, 
unacceptable. One  contemporary described it as “an unhappy accident, which the 
meannesse of the occasion renders reproveable, even among duellers”.21
The  King’s response to this duel was quick and arguably showed no favour to 
his favourite. He banished Taaffe from the royal presence within a matter of days, 
despite the offender begging the King for pardon in writing and despite simultaneous 
appeals to his patron, and one of Charles  II’s closest advisors, Ormond, for assistance 
16 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/183-4.
17 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/183-4 ; Hutton, (1989, p. 124) ; Smith 
(2011, pp. 34, 82).
18 Manning (2003, p. 208) ;  O’Brien (1647, p. 3) ; Bagwell (1909, pp. 157-158).
19 Carte (1736, p. 234).
20 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/181 ; Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon 
State Papers, vol. 58/184 ; Birch (1742b, p. 337).
21 Birch (1742b, p. 340) ; HMC (1876, pp. 146-147).
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in avoiding punishment.22 Banishment, it would seem, was a severe punishment for 
Taaffe. Indeed, the Viscount believed that an extended absence from the royal presence 
would ruin him, as he depended entirely upon the exiled court for his subsistence. 
Furthermore, Taaffe believed that it would also lead people to cast aspersions upon 
his name. After he learned of his fate, he wrote to Charles II both to  condemn the 
severity of the punishment and to seek forgiveness again. He sought this absolution 
on the grounds that he would have been despised (i.e. his honour would have been 
damaged) had he avoided what was forced upon him. In an effort to strengthen his 
case for absolution Taaffe called on the King in two separate letters to hear two 
witness accounts of the duel. The witnesses he specifically named were  Keith’s 
seconds, Fleming and Hopton. Clearly, there was a degree of collusion between 
the rival duellists, as Taaffe expected his opponents to protect his interests with the 
King. Taaffe also argued that Charles II should not punish him, because the King 
had made no previous public pronouncement against duels.23 This was actually true, 
as Charles  II’s did not issue a specific declaration against duelling to his followers 
until the following November.24 This was also a traditional defence against English 
Crown attempts to quash duelling. Having said that, royal disapproval of duelling 
was still well known before that declaration and other duellists had similarly fled 
the exiled court if they had injured their opponents in an encounter. Clearly, Taaffe, 
although technically correct, was taking something of a liberty when he claimed that 
Charles II had not forbidden duelling amongst his supporters. He must have known 
that the King frowned upon it. Yet, like many before, he preferred to defend his own 
honour than to follow his  Monarch’s wishes.25  Taaffe’s duel with Keith, it should be 
said, was not the sole cause of the November declaration against duelling. A number 
of other duels also occurred in or around this court between August and November 
1658. About the same time as Taaffe killed Keith, for instance, Viscount Newburgh 
(another inveterate duellist) was seriously wounded and left for dead by a captain 
from his own regiment. The unnamed captain, believing he had killed his opponent, 
likewise fled the court. The cumulative impact of these duels prompted Charles II 
to take action.26
The declaration spelt out the treatment that duellists could expect from their 
King. It stated that the disturbers of the  King’s peace would face his wrath, lose 
all entitlement to employment in the royal service forever and would be denied 
entry into the royal presence again. These measures clearly echoed the punishment 
imposed on Taaffe the previous August. Moreover, it also reflected early-Stuart 
influence, as it drew upon earlier writings by Francis Bacon and Henry Howard, 
Earl of Northampton. Both of these men, arguing that duellists would baulk at the 
prospect of being removed from the font of royal honour, had suggested similar 
punishments for duellists in 1613. The declaration, moreover, threatened that 
the King would not seek to protect duellists from the wrath of local laws against 
22 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/181 ; Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon 
State Papers, vol. 58/183-4.
23 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/181 ; Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon 
State Papers, vol. 58/196.
24 Warner (1920, p. 263).
25 Green (1884, pp. 310-311) ; Larkin, Hughes (1973, pp. 303-304) ; Peltonen (2003, pp. 65-78).
26 Scott (1907, p. 373) ; HMC (1907, pp. 130-131).
HONOUR, DUELLING AND ROYAL POWER IN EXILE 55
duelling : another clear sign that duellists risked losing royal favour (and a clear 
indicator that local authorities allowed Charles II de facto jurisdiction over his own 
courtiers on these matters). The November declaration likewise threatened to levy 
similar punishments against those who carried challenges between people, and all 
persons who knew of a duel were ordered to report it to the  King’s Privy Council. In 
order to publicise it amongst the courtiers this declaration was read from the pulpit 
and by the  King’s Gentleman-Usher in the Presence Chamber, one of the traditional 
public spaces of the royal court.27
This declaration served a similar purpose to  Cromwell’s 1654 ordinance against 
duelling. Yet, despite some similarities, the November declaration shows that the 
court took a different approach to this problem than its Commonwealth-based rival. 
Both the Commonwealth and the exiled court prescribed punishments for persons 
who carried challenges between persons, and both insisted that, to prevent them 
being carried out, challenges should be made known to the relevant authorities. 
Yet,  Cromwell’s 1654 ordinance insisted that all persons caught issuing, carrying 
or accepting challenges would face at least six months in prison, without bail, 
before being sent to trial. Failure to report a challenge, under the  Commonwealth’s 
ordinance, would also be taken as proof of having accepted it. Finally, the 
1654 ordinance went further than Charles  II’s 1658 declaration in its proposed 
punishments for duellists. That ordinance stated that anyone who participated in a 
duel would, at the very least, risk permanent banishment from the Commonwealth, 
while participants in a clash that led to fatality would be tried for the capital crime 
of murder. This, unlike Charles II’s 1658 declaration, went against the advice given 
by Northampton and Bacon some 41 years earlier. They had both  contended that 
such severity was inappropriate. Indeed, Bacon stated it would be ineffective, as the 
threat of death would have little impact on someone who was willing to risk life and 
limb for honour.28 The difference should not be ascribed to the exiled  court’s lack 
of a proper legal framework either. As mentioned earlier, this body was capable of 
executing persons for capital crimes. A clear sign of legitimacy of court as a royal 
court as we shall see later, it was also capable of  constituting ad-hoc courts, based on 
pre-exile models, to examine particular issues.
In  contrast, the measures taken by Charles II against duelling throughout his 
exile arguably represent a significant (and, in all likelihood, deliberate)  continuity 
between the exiled court and its ante-bellum predecessors. James I had made a 
 considerable effort to ensure peace between the nobility in his court and to prevent 
duelling, issuing a declaration against it in 1613. Charles I, as we shall see later on, 
also made strenuous efforts to prevent duels amongst his courtiers. Indeed, some 
historians have even seen Charles  I’s failure to maintain peace between these elite 
persons as a  contributory cause to the outbreak of the British and Irish civil wars.29 It 
is clear from  Taaffe’s case that, superficially at least, Charles  II’s exiled court made 
 comparable efforts to preserve the peace amongst its courtiers. Similarly, Charles II’s 
1658 declaration against duelling was plainly inspired both by the actions of his 
27 Bacon (1614, pp. 17-18) ; James I (1614, pp. 86-93) ; Warner (1920, p. 263) ; Peltonen (2003, pp. 113-
114) ; Banks (2010, p. 10).
28 Bacon (1614, p. 18) ; James I (1614, pp. 37-38) ; Cromwell (1654, pp. 2-5) ; Warner (1920, p. 263). 
Peltonen (2003, pp. 113-114).
29 Hibbard (1996, pp. 174-176).
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royal grandfather and the writings of other early-Stuart figures who wished to put an 
end to duelling.
So, given the royal disapproval of duelling and the obvious belief that duellists 
who injured their opponents would be subject to royal punishment, why was the 
practice so prominent amongst the exiles ? A number of inter-related reasons can 
be advanced. Some of these are unique to the exiled  court’s circumstances. Other 
explanations are not, however, as they hold true for other elite early-modern 
 communities. Dealing with the former set of explanations first, one must begin by 
pointing out that duelling amongst soldiers, particularly within the officer class, 
was a prominent feature of the early-modern period.30 Between 1656 and 1659, the 
years of the Stuart alliance with Spain, war was the whole reason behind the Stuart 
presence in the Spanish Netherlands. Consequently, many of those who followed the 
court at this time were military men, serving as soldiers and officers in the  combined 
Spanish-Stuart forces. This is certainly true of Taaffe and Talbot. Given the military 
character of Charles  II’s court in the Spanish Netherlands, it  comes as no surprise 
that violence occurred within it. Elite  culture also played a part. Like many other 
members of the early-modern elite, these duellists had a strong sense of honour 
and were willing to protect their own good name and reputation through violence. 
Furthermore, as historians like Roger Manning have pointed out, all governments 
in this period, exiled and non-exiled, lacked the means of coercion necessary to 
keep the peace and enforce the law. Consequently, private individuals, especially 
members of the highly-militarised social elite, often resorted to violence to right a 
perceived wrong.31
These previous explanations for duelling, which can certainly be applied to 
elites generally in England and France during this period, were, in all likelihood, 
exacerbated by the unique circumstances of the exiled court. For example, some 
have identified political instability as a cause of duelling in the early-modern era. 
One can fairly claim that these exiled royalists were subject to a high level of political 
uncertainty. Many, if not all, of them had been forced abroad by civil war. Making 
matters worse, their exile tended to be in territories undergoing their own periods 
of political stress, like the war-scarred Spanish Netherlands of the late-1650s.32 
The causes of violence suggested by Genet-Rouffiac in her study of the banished 
Jacobite court, namely a sense of dispossession and powerlessness, might also have 
had some part to play here. The circumstances of the Taaffe-Keith would support 
this. At the time the duel took place, the exiled royalists’ fortunes were especially 
low. The Spanish alliance was going badly, efforts to promote rebellion at home 
had failed, and the small royalist army in Flanders had been destroyed at the battle 
of the Dunes in mid-June 1658.33 A sense of powerlessness may  consequently have 
been widespread amongst the exiles. Poverty was also a problem, with many of the 
soldiers in Flanders being owed  considerable arrears of pay at this time.34 The fact 
that Taaffe and Keith fought over a small sum of money only draws attention to the 
30 Kiernan (1988, p. 113).
31 Manning (2003, p. 143).
32 Spierenburg (2008, p. 76).
33 Firth (1903, p. 85) ; Cronin (2010, pp. 72-76).
34 Archives Générales du Royaume, Bruxelles, Secrétairerie  d’État et de Guerre, Registre 265/323 ; 
Birch (1742b, p. 453).
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loss of wealth and resources suffered by these exiles. Yet, though they probably made 
duelling more likely, one should not exaggerate the impact of political instability, or 
a sense of powerlessness and dispossession, on patterns of violence amongst these 
exiles. Individuals such as Talbot,  Taaffe’s accomplice, did not lack funds at this time 
and many managed to retain some pretence of gentility. All of the duellists involved 
in this fight travelled to the field of honour in a coach, for example. Additionally, 
the royal army was in the process of recovering some of its former strength. Duels 
 continued after September 1658 as well, despite the royalist cause receiving a major 
fillip then, with the death of Oliver Cromwell.35 Given all this, one can reasonably 
 conclude that these specific factors only exacerbated, at best, an already pre-existing 
inclination towards duelling amongst these exiles.
In  contrast, if one were seeking a unique cause of duelling amongst the exiled 
courtiers, then national rivalries would seem to be a more promising avenue of 
exploration. This exiled court was a place where royalists from England, Scotland 
and Ireland came into regular and extended  contact with each other. Irish and 
Scottish courtiers had previously attended the early-Stuart court in London, of 
course, and their presence there did sometimes create tension between them and 
their English counterparts.36 Yet their numbers at the early-Stuart court, of necessity, 
would have been relatively lower and they would not have been present as often 
there. Given the greater interaction of different nations in the exiled court, then, 
 Newport’s aforementioned  comment about tensions between English, Irish and 
Scottish exiles becomes significant. Indeed, Newport made this  comment in a letter 
describing the Taaffe-Keith duel, though his account of the duel erroneously stated 
that Talbot wounded the Scottish royalist Fleming and that Benion fought Hopton, 
without causing any harm. Nonetheless,  Newport’s account, which reflects a belief 
that Irish and Scottish exiles were in violent  conflict with each other, may still 
be significant. Such rivalries did not arise solely from a natural enmity between 
the nations, though. Instead, other factors probably exacerbated them. Religious 
divisions may have played such a role. Certainly, there was great religious distrust 
between the Catholics, Presbyterians and Anglicans in this court throughout the 
exile. The treatment each nation received from their Spanish allies at this time may 
be another factor. According to the Cromwellian  Protectorate’s newspaper, The 
Publick Intelligencer, the Spanish treated the Irish more favourably, causing feuds 
between them and the English.37
NEWBURGH AND STANLEY, AND OTHER DUELS
National rivalries certainly played their role in a duel fought in April 1659. 
This again began at a tennis match. Here, an argument near the court led to a clash 
between English and Scottish courtiers. The incident began when, two courtiers, 
Viscount Newburgh and Edward Stanley, turned up drunk at a match. While drunk, 
35 Birch (1742b, p. 453) ; Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/184 ; Firth (1903, 
pp. 97-100).
36 Brown (1993, pp. 548-549).
37 British Library, Thomason tracts, The Publick Intelligencer, 5-12 January, 1657, 79 : E.500[15] ; 
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Stanley playfully pulled at  Newburgh’s hair. The Scottish lord responded by calling 
Stanley a “whore son puppy” and threatening him with a beating. Stanley, offended 
and desiring retribution, but not wishing to act violently before the King, then 
left the match. Accompanied by some friends, he returned to his apartments and 
collected a cudgel. He returned to the tennis court and found Newburgh “in a lane… 
pissing”. Once Newburgh had finished, Stanley attacked him with the cudgel. Such 
cudgellings were not necessarily administered to inflict hurt. Instead, they were 
often carried out to shame and demean a rival, and to provoke a duel. Stanley carried 
out his cudgelling with such gusto that he succeeded in breaking the club over 
 Newburgh’s head. Newburgh, seemingly unaffected by the beating, seized a sword 
from one of his  companions and attacked Stanley, who had also swapped his cudgel 
for a sword. The fight only ended when the  King’s youngest brother, the Duke of 
Gloucester, intervened. This is noteworthy as the argument that led to the fight broke 
out in the royal presence. Indeed, one of  Stanley’s  companions was later reported 
to have exclaimed as he was leaving the tennis match that he would have struck 
Newburgh there and then if Charles II had not been present.38
A council of the  King’s nobility sat in judgment on those involved in this fracas 
afterwards. It soon divided on national lines, however. Much to the chagrin of some 
English courtiers, the Irish in the council sided with the Scottish and accused Stanley 
of giving the first offence. Clearly national divisions had a role in assigning blame 
for this duel, if not for causing it. The council, however, also tells us something 
about the relationship between the exiled elite and their monarch. Despite the  King’s 
previous declaration, this council did not meet to punish both duellists. Rather, it 
met to decide who had caused the duel : the point of division alone is enough to 
indicate that. Participating in the duel, then, was not thought worthy of punishment, 
but causing the duel by giving offence was. This in itself is interesting, as it shows 
the exiled royal court attempted to dispense justice on questions of honour through 
a mechanism similar to the one used by its early Stuart predecessors. Specifically, 
this was an attempt to copy the solution suggested by the Earl of Northampton in 
1613, namely to have men of high standing pass judgement on disputes over honour 
and reputation.39 This council of nobility, then, was a relatively informal version of 
the court of Chivalry, established by James I in 1613-1614, and used extensively by 
Charles I in the 1630s to prevent duels by punishing those who had offended another 
 gentleman’s honour. It is also yet another clear example of the exiled Caroline Stuart 
court following early Stuart precedent.40 What is more, this was not the only time 
that such a council of nobility met in exile. In 1647, Prince Rupert of the Rhine, 
feeling dishonoured by some speeches made by Lord Digby, challenged the latter to 
a duel. After Charles II, then Prince of Wales, intervened to halt this duel, however, 
a council of nobility  convened to decide on the satisfaction owed to the Prince. The 
matter was resolved when Digby acknowledged that he had wronged the Prince 
before the council.41
38 HMC (1907, pp. 130-131) ; Berwick (1819, p. 251).
39 Peltonen (2003, pp. 135-137) ;  Cromwell’s 1654 ordinance also deemed that offending  someone’s 
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Charles II ultimately settled the later dispute between Newburgh and Stanley by 
calling both duellists together, forgiving them for fighting in the royal presence and 
imposing bonds of friendship on them.42 Yet, though Charles II ended the dispute, 
this fight shows the limits of his power to punish duellists. This quarrel occurred 
after the issuing of the anti-duelling declaration and, as reports on the  combat show, 
all those involved knew of royal opposition to duels. The fight also started in the 
 King’s presence, affronting royal honour. Yet, Charles II did not punish the duellists 
severely, but chose to make peace between them instead.
For his followers, the King clearly was the ultimate judge. Taaffe, in two different 
letters written to Charles II soon after his killing of Keith, certainly accepted that 
he should be subject to royal justice.43 Furthermore, as the November declaration 
on duelling showed, loss of his favour and patronage was  considered a severe 
punishment.  Taaffe’s duel with Keith, though it took place before the issuing of the 
anti-duelling declaration, also shows that efforts were made to enforce punishments 
for duelling. It also shows that royal favour did not necessarily provide persons with 
immunity from punishment. Yet, ultimately,  Taaffe’s case also demonstrates that the 
enforcement of these punishments was lax.  Taaffe’s loss of the  monarch’s favour 
did not last long,  coming nowhere near forever, as the anti-duelling declaration had 
threatened. By February 1659, six months after  Keith’s death, Charles II was writing 
to Taaffe again. At the end of October that same year, Charles II, who was in the 
Pyrenees at Franco-Spanish peace negotiations in Fuentarabia at the time, promised 
Taaffe that they would always be friends. He also gave the Viscount permission to 
join him. Taaffe took great joy in publicising this, as the King denied other courtiers 
permission to do so.44 Finally, and most tellingly, Taaffe was amongst those Irish 
who took the Scottish side in the Council of nobility in early 1659. Nine months 
after killing Keith in a duel, then, Taaffe was back in the royal presence. He was also 
sitting in judgement on other duellists.45
A RULER OVER DUELLERS :
CHARLES  II’S EXILED COURT AND ELITE VIOLENCE
Judging by all this, the exiled  court’s ability to prevent duelling amongst its 
members was limited, at best. The councils of nobility held in exile evidently did 
not try to punish duellists for taking the law into their own hands. They sought 
instead to limit duelling by providing an alternative forum for deciding matters of 
honour between potential rivals. Judging by events in the exiled royalist  community, 
though, it seems to have provided little discouragement to duelling. It may even have 
encouraged it by, as early Stuart critics of the court of  chivalry likewise suggested, 
endorsing the notions of personal honour that underpinned the duel. We can see this 
if we return to the 1647 council of nobility,  convened to resolve the dispute between 
Prince Rupert and Digby. One of the nobles on that council was Lord Thomas 
42 HMC (1907, pp. 130-131).
43 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/181 ; Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon 
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Wentworth. Immediately after that particular council met, Wentworth, according 
to the Irish courtier Daniel  O’Neill, tried to force Digby into fighting a duel with 
another exile, Lord Henry Wilmot.46
Another  contributing factor to the  court’s inability to punish duelling was the 
 King’s attitude to the issue. The general impression in the historiography of the 
Stuarts is that Charles II tolerated duelling. Kiernan states that while he issued 
declarations in the years after the Restoration against duelling, Charles II did not 
enforce them rigorously and generally tended to pardon offenders afterwards.47 
This was also clearly true before the Restoration. The question is why was he so 
forgiving ? Duels such as these must surely have embarrassed his cause and clearly 
created dissensions amongst his followers. Additionally, Charles II was an exiled 
monarch who was actively attempting to assert his claim to be the head of the lawful 
governments of England, Scotland and Ireland. Yet, such duelling amongst his 
followers must have weakened his assertion, as it challenged two aspects of his, 
or any, claim to governmental authority : the prerogatives of legitimising violence 
and of dispensing justice. There are many possible reasons for his indulgence. For 
one, the act of judging and forgiving duellists probably added to the royal dignity : 
no unimportant matter for an exiled King. Accounts of the Newburgh-Stanley case 
show that there was a certain degree of ritual and display involved in such acts of 
forgiveness and peacemaking. Both men were sent a paper detailing what faults they 
were to acknowledge by Charles  II’s garter King of arms, Edward Walker (one of 
the officials charged with organising court ceremony). They then entered the  King’s 
chamber, where they both submitted to their Monarch. Once he had forgiven them 
for offending him, he then obliged them to forgive each other. Similar, semi-private, 
rituals of forgiveness between feuding courtiers were, as Hibbard has pointed out, 
also a feature of Charles  I’s antebellum court.48
Secondly, while duelling represented an implicit challenge to royal claims to be a 
dispenser of justice, punishing duelling also provided the crown with the opportunity 
to carry out, informally at least, this very function. Convening councils of nobility 
to judge questions of honour testifies to this. Forgiving duellists may have also 
allowed the monarch to portray himself as both merciful and bountiful. Similarly, the 
 Monarch’s granting of mercy to duellists may have reinforced the bonds of loyalty 
between the former and the latter. In the Newburgh-Stanley case, there may have 
been pragmatic reasons for forgiving the duellists. The council of the  King’s nobility 
certainly brought tensions between the different national groups within the exiled 
court to the surface. Publicly placing bonds of mutual friendship upon both duellists 
could have been a ritualistic way of defusing this tension and papering over the 
cracks within the exiled  community. Furthermore, being merciful meant that no one 
was likely to object to the ‘punishment’, as Taaffe did when he initially suffered a 
severe reprimand for killing Keith.49
Additionally, though he could play at being a judge, Charles II could not punish 
his followers severely, as he could not risk alienating them. He relied upon these 
followers to provide him with the means to maintain whatever political and military 
46 Carte (1739a, p. 156) ; Peltonen (2003, p. 141).
47 Kiernan, (1988, p. 100).
48 HMC (1907, p. 130) ; Hibbard (1996, p. 170).
49 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/196-7.
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power he had in exile. Specifically, Charles II, if he wanted to retain any hopes of 
recovering his lost kingdoms, was reliant on his exiled courtiers to provide him with 
resources, including soldiers. The military arm they provided him with during the 
Interregnum was substantial. When Charles II allied with Spain in 1656 his adherents 
brought between 3,000 and 5,000 troops into the Spanish forces. These troops, 
mostly Irish and Scottish, were  controlled by the very elite who indulged in duelling, 
and it was they who brought them to the Spanish Netherlands. We have already 
seen how Taaffe prevented Irish mercenary soldiers from defecting from Spanish 
service in 1655. Many of the duellists mentioned in this paper also played a similar 
role. Viscount  Muskerry’s regiment, for instance, was noted for its strong loyalty to 
its  commander. Similarly, Talbot and Newburgh were also military officers. Talbot, 
moreover, was a favourite of Charles  II’s brother, the Duke of York. The Prince was 
a highly respected military  commander during the exile, having made his name in 
French service prior to 1656. Moreover, by the mid-1650s it was felt that Irish troops 
serving on the  continent were particularly inclined to serve under this Prince. All 
this made him important to royalist military efforts during the Interregnum. This 
is reflected in Charles  II’s insistence on his brother joining him in Flanders once 
the Spanish alliance was secured, despite  York’s objections. Yet, once he arrived 
there, York proved to be particularly sensitive about fraternal intervention in his 
household. At one point in 1656, after his brother attempted to remove a councillor, 
John Berkeley, from the  Duke’s household, York withdrew into the United Provinces 
in protest until he got his way.50 This behaviour demonstrates how unwise it could be 
for the King to punish someone like Talbot for duelling.
All this meant that if Charles II was to have access to the troops these men 
 commanded (and to the other resources that they brought as well, such as privateers 
and money) he had to tolerate their behaviour, and overlook their violent ways. 
Instead, his best bet was to try to ensure that duelling did not undermine his personal 
authority within the court and create tensions amongst his supporters. This, while 
it highlights the fragility of his position vis-à-vis his own elite supporters, does not 
make Charles II an unusual early-modern monarch. Other kings, including the many 
non-exiled ones, were in the same boat : a reality not lost on many historians. Other 
kings likewise needed their gentry and nobility to fight in, and lead their armies, and 
repressing the duelling inclinations of these people arguably meant suppressing their 
martial instincts as well.51
Aside from casting light on royal-elite relations, Charles  II’s interventions 
in these duels also pose a challenge to Norbert  Elias’s theories surrounding the 
civilising of the warrior nobility in the early-modern period within court society. 
Elias hypothesised that royal courts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
were spaces where efforts were made to modify noble behaviour, particularly their 
military inclinations and their indulgence in violence, through etiquette, ritual, and 
the distribution of social and financial capital. The court, Elias argued, used rewards, 
along with renaissance  concepts of courtesy and good behaviour, to turn them into 
peaceful courtiers, who were dependent upon their monarch.52 If the exiled Stuart 
court  conformed to this theory, it should then have made strenuous efforts to eradicate 
50 Clarke (1816, pp. 276-277) ; Cronin (2010, pp. 165-176).
51 Kiernan (1988, pp. 68-69) ; Manning (2003, p. 142).
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private duelling amongst its followers. Charles II and his court, however, seem to 
have fallen between two stools when it came to  controlling duelling. In some ways, 
despite being exiled, Charles II acted as one would expect a centralising absolutist 
monarch to do. He certainly sought to curb their violent tendencies of his courtiers, 
by letting them know that he frowned upon duelling. He also issued declarations 
against the practice, threatened severe punishments against those involved in such 
actions, and established law courts (albeit ad-hoc, informal, ones) to adjudicate on 
issues arising out of duels. At the same time, however, he simultaneously involved 
himself in the world of the duellists almost as a fellow nobleman, and not as the 
embodiment of an absolutist centralising government. The councils of nobility 
called by Charles II to resolve two of the duels under study here did not apply a 
‘top-down’ solution to the problem of duelling. Instead, they deliberately drew upon 
those notions of honour prevalent amongst the exiled courtiers. Charles  II’s informal 
exiled law courts, then, were designed to accommodate his own supporters’ views, 
not alter them.
Comparisons with other seventeenth-century duels also reinforce this idea. In his 
study of the role of violence in the life of another elite royalist, Sir John Reresby, 
James Sharpe has drawn attention to the role of persons of high social standing, 
such as the upper nobility and government officials, in pacifying  conflicts, without 
having recourse to law courts or formal legal sanctions. Reresby had a varied career, 
serving as a sheriff, a justice of the peace, an MP and governor of York at different 
stages. He also had a propensity for duelling and brawling throughout his adult 
years. Frequently, however, the  conflicts he was involved in were defused by the 
intervention of his social superiors, such as Charles  II’s natural son, the Duke of 
Monmouth. These interventions frequently ended the feud by making the antagonists 
accept their rivals as friends. Additionally,  Reresby’s violent streak did not stop him 
securing political office, despite a propensity to quarrel with his fellow officials.53
This clearly has certain parallels with the handling of  Taaffe’s duel by the Crown. 
The Irish nobleman, though banished from court for some little time, was ultimately 
allowed to carry out certain functions for the Crown and he did not suffer any long-
term loss of royal favour. Clearly then, whether it occurred during exile or in the 
Restoration period, falling foul of the  Crown’s attempts to limit elite violence did not 
exclude members of that same elite from serving in royal government. More tellingly, 
Charles II, though he formally and officially proscribed duelling, preferred to handle 
such violence in a manner that was in keeping with elite social norms. The King 
resolved the Stanley-Newburgh rivalry not by punishing them for breaching his anti-
duelling declaration, but by acting as an elite peacemaker, much as other members 
of the social elite did for Reresby after the Restoration. The  King’s participation 
in noble  culture in this instance is made clear by a  contemporary description of 
the royal actions, because it states that the King urged the two rivals to forgive 
the affronts to each  other’s honour, because he had “pardoned the affront done to 
himself [the King]”.54 Charles II, in other words, made it clear that he too had his 
personal honour to protect, just like his own courtiers, and their honour code was his 
honour code. It is fair to say that the  King’s courtiers realised this. Taaffe certainly 
did, and he used it to his advantage after he killed Keith. When appealing to Charles 
53 Sharpe (2008, pp. 95-105).
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II for a pardon in late August 1658, Taaffe advanced a number of arguments. Most 
of these have been described previously. Taaffe also asserted, however, that failure 
to defend his honour would have perpetually stained his character with everybody, 
including the King.
… had I avoided what was forced upon me, I am persuaded your Majesty 
would have had as despicable an opinion of me … for though your calling and 
 conscience, direct you to disapprove it [the duel], yet honour and reason make it 
necessary in this age”55
One of course, could object that the exiled  Crown’s treatment of duelling cannot 
be taken as a legitimate challenge to  Elias’s theory, as it arises out of an atypical 
early-modern court. This is to ignore two important points. First, Elias’ theory is 
itself based on an atypical court : specifically, Louis  XIV’s court at Versailles. Jeroen 
Duindam has highlighted how unwise it is to treat the French court at Versailles, 
as described by Elias, as a universally valid model, and has even suggested that it 
is not appropriate to use it as a model for early-modern France. Duindam has also 
argued that there was no such thing as a typical early-modern court, as substantial 
differences existed between royal courts in different places and eras.56 Second, 
unique though it undoubtedly was, Charles  II’s exiled court still met some of the 
criteria of a princely court. Anna Keay has shown that it also  continued to be a centre 
for royal ceremony, for example. More importantly, and as mentioned earlier, it was 
still both a  King’s household and a political space. How else could you describe an 
institution that claimed the right to govern three kingdoms,  commanded the political 
loyalty of a  considerable body of supporters, formed an alliance with one of early-
modern  Europe’s most significant powers and put together a small army ?57
Finally, though the clashes studied here do not  conform to the classic  conception 
of a duel, they all can still be classified as such. They all meet Billacois’ definition 
of the duel : “a fight between two or several individuals (but always with equal 
numbers on either side), equally armed, for the purpose of proving either the truth of 
a disputed question or the valour, courage and honour of each  combatant”.58 Though 
they appear chaotic enough at first glance, there were some rules  constraining the 
 combatants. All the  combats involved equal numbers on each side, and seconds 
accompanied the principal  combatants. They also had witnesses and, if we ignore 
 Stanley’s initial use of a cudgel, the  combatants fought with the same weapons. Even 
then Stanley probably only used the cudgel to force his rival to fight a duel and he put 
it aside once Newburgh drew a sword. All the described clashes also meet  Peltonen’s 
definition of the duel. They were private fights, caused by an insult and organised to 
defend a  combatant’s sense of honour.59 Well-established rules also clearly applied to 
the  combatants after the fight. Taaffe, for instance, expected some of his opponents 
to collude with him in avoiding punishment for defending his honour. Why else did 
he name Fleming and Hopton as witnesses to the truth of his version of events ? 
55 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/196.
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Indeed, Taaffe and his fellow duellists may have even gone further in their collusion. 
If we analyse  Taaffe’s account of his duel closely it seems strange that, after having 
initially turned down  Taaffe’s offer of re-imbursement, Keith should include a threat 
of violence with a request to return the money. On the other hand, it is entirely 
possible that Keith made no such threat, but that Taaffe found this change of heart 
both personally insulting and ungentlemanly. If this was the case, then it is more 
likely that Taaffe issued the original challenge, but that is was afterwards agreed to 
blame Keith for provoking the duel, thus effectively blaming the fight on someone 
who was beyond the  King’s justice.60
Yet, though clearly highly ritualised and regulated, many of the aforementioned 
clashes do show some variation from previously established duelling patterns of the 
British and Irish elite. According to Peltonen, seconds did not generally participate 
in duels in early-seventeenth century Britain and Ireland, but only oversaw them.61 
This claim is partly- contradicted by James  Cleland’s 1607 textbook for would-be 
young English nobles, Hero Paideia. In this, the author remarked that persons who 
acted as seconds at a duel would end up participating in the fight. Yet, Cleland also 
insisted that such a turn of events was undesirable. He  consequently instructed his 
readers not to employ seconds at all.62 As mentioned previously, however,  Taaffe’s 
duel was organised according to a French model. It is also more akin to duels fought 
in Restoration era Britain and Ireland, as seconds became increasingly involved in 
the fighting in these latter  combats.63  Taaffe’s duel is not the only example of such 
behaviour amongst the wider circle of royalist exiles. Thomas Sandys, for instance, 
fought in a two-on-two duel in 1647,  conducted on horseback and fought with both 
pistol and sword, while in France. He and his opponent both survived, but their 
seconds killed each other. Similarly, when Wilmot and Digby eventually fought 
their duel in 1647, just outside Paris it turned into a three-on-three duel. This was 
despite the protests of both Digby and Wilmot, who sought to have their seconds 
stand aloof.64 The Stanley-Newburgh  contest for its part, though the seconds did not 
participate, lacked any formal challenge or organisation and was somewhat more 
chaotic. Consequently, there may not have been time to organise the participation of 
seconds in this clash. It may be significant, though, that one of  Stanley’s  companions 
also felt insulted by  Newburgh’s behaviour and threatened violence against the 
Viscount, as it implies a willingness to get involved in the quarrel.
All this suggests two things. First, despite the  court’s attempts to preserve 
traditional British norms as best it could, particularly in how it dealt with duels, 
local influences nonetheless affected exile behaviour, causing pre-exile modes of 
behaviour to alter. The exiles changed the way they fought duels during the 1640s and 
1650s, abandoning the format used in Britain and Ireland prior to the civil wars. This 
may have happened because, under  continental influence, the principals’ seconds 
60 Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon State Papers, vol. 58/181 ; Bodleian Library Oxford, Clarendon 
State Papers, vol. 58/183-4 ; Kiernan (1988, pp. 149-150) ; Peltonen (2003, p. 48).
61 To back up his case Peltonen cited an English duel from 1618. In this duel a second, who had picked 
up the habit in France, unsuccessfully attempted to participate in the fighting. His opposite number 
refused to join in, however. Peltonen (2003, p. 60n).
62 Cleland (1607, pp. 237-238).
63 Shoemaker (2002, p. 531) ; Kelly (1995, p. 32).
64 Carte (1739a, pp. 156-158) ; Knowles (1980, p. 84) ; Newman, (1993, p. 128).
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somehow came to believe that their own honour was at stake as well and they had to 
defend it. The aforementioned threat made by one of  Stanley’s  companions before 
the clash with Newburgh in April 1659 clearly supports this possibility. Similarly, 
Daniel  O’Neill fought in the Wilmot-Digby duel because he felt personally insulted 
by  Wilmot’s behaviour before the fight.65 For their part, Hopton and Talbot probably 
fought in the Taaffe-Keith duel because the earlier tennis match had implicated them 
in the affair. Second, it can be argued that this exiled elite is responsible for bringing 
 continental-style duels into Britain and Ireland. Certainly, many former elite royalist 
exiles, such as the Earls of Ossory and Buckingham, indulged in  continental-style 
duels after the Restoration, and James Kelly maintains that these very exiles were 
important for transmitting codes of honour and  continental duelling practices into 
Restoration Ireland.66
CONCLUSIONS
In Charles  II’s exiled court, as in English and French elite  culture in the 
seventeenth century, individuals could, and did, use violence to defend their name, 
their position and their status within elite society. Indeed, if one was to accept the 
anecdotal impression given by  contemporary accounts, the exiled courtiers were 
more inclined to do so than others. Assuming that a greater tendency towards 
violence actually did exist amongst this elite, one could reasonably speculate that a 
sense of powerlessness and dispossession associated with exile lay behind this. Yet, 
tempting as this idea is, there is actually little hard empirical evidence to support 
it. Furthermore, there seems to be nothing especially unique about the causes of 
the duels under study. It is clear that, within this court, perceived slights of an elite 
 person’s sense of honour could, and did, lead to duels amongst the royalist exiles, 
just as it did with other  contemporary elite European  communities. Similarly, the 
duellists defended their behaviour with the same arguments that other generations of 
duellists had used previously. In short, while exile may have increased the likelihood 
of duels occurring in this environment, it did not alter the reasons or justifications 
for duelling.
Exile did not alter elite duelling practices in other important ways. These private 
 combats  continued to display many of the features associated with duels in Britain 
and Ireland previously. They involved even numbers of  combatants, and the same 
clear, socially acceptable, rules of behaviour that had governed duellists’ actions 
before the royalist exile  continued to do so during the exile. Refusing a challenge 
from  one’s social equal was  considered ungentlemanly and those who were slow 
to accept one were soon pressurised to do so. Participants in duels during the exile 
were also expected to co-operate with each other in sidestepping punishment for 
their actions. The efforts of the exiled court to prevent duelling likewise owed much 
to previous practice. During the 1650s, Charles II employed the same measures as 
previous generations of Stuart kings to  control duelling. Similar punishments were 
threatened, similar rituals of forgiveness were used to defuse tensions between 
courtiers and ad-hoc courts, inspired by those of Charles I and James I, were 
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established to resolve questions of honour. Exile only changed the duelling practices 
of British and Irish elite persons in one notable way. French-style duelling, in which 
seconds actively participated in the fighting, clearly became more  common amongst 
this elite during the Interregnum and this fashion was transported home with them 
after the Restoration. In effect, exile, by familiarising elite royalist exiles with more 
dangerous practices, had the medium to long-term impact of making duelling in 
Britain and Ireland more hazardous. The overwhelming levels of  continuity between 
royal and elite practices in exile on one hand, and early-Stuart practices on the other, 
are important. They mean that the exiled court can usefully be used to study royal 
and elite attitudes to duelling generally, and can cast light upon wider royal-noble/
elite relations.
Bearing this last point in mind then, what can we say about Charles  II’s relationship 
with his own exiled elite ? Certainly, it is clear that this monarch retained the political 
authority to act as a judge of his own courtiers, despite his exile. Yet, he also clearly 
lacked the effective political power necessary to enforce any real punishment against 
duellists. As pointed out earlier, this lack of power to punish duelling amongst his 
militarised elite was not unique to this King, however. Other early-modern rulers 
had the same problem. Instead, it is arguably more significant that Charles  II’s exiled 
followers  continued to accept that their King had the right to oversee questions of 
justice and peace within their  community, so long as he did not alienate them in 
doing so, and so long as he showed a willingness to participate in their honour code. 
This he plainly did, and this demonstrates that Charles II was willing to co-operate 
with his own elite on the issue of duelling, rather than coerce them. While the 
exiled court employed English-style courts and legal precedents to decide duelling 
issues, it only did so in defence of an  individual’s honour. Furthermore, Charles II 
simultaneously used rituals and informal peacekeeping methods familiar to his elite 
to resolve problems arising from honour disputes. This means that royal efforts to 
 control elite violence during the exile did not take a ‘top-down’ approach. Instead, 
the Crown took a more inclusive and co-operative approach to the problem : one 
designed to avoid alienating its own elite followers. The King actively participated 
in the honour code of his elite followers and tried to use it to limit the negative 
 consequences of their duelling. Charles  II’s active participation in his own  elite’s 
honour code, however, had one important corollary. It meant that he had to pardon 
Taaffe for killing Keith and allow him back into court. If Charles II wanted to be 
seen as someone who shared his  elite’s honour code, then he could not inflict a harsh 
punishment on Taaffe for defending his honour. This meant that once Taaffe asked 
for pardon he was almost sure to get it, especially after he recognised his  King’s role 
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